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Abstract 
In this paper I propose that only part of our experience of events, and products in particu-
lar, should be coined aesthetic. This part, the aesthetic experience, is restricted to the 
(dis)pleasure that results from sensory perception. The main part of the paper is devoted to 
explaining why we experience certain things as gratifying to our senses. Following thinking 
in evolutionary psychology, it is argued that we aesthetically prefer environmental patterns 
and features that are beneficial for the development of the senses’ functioning and our sur-
vival in general. Four general principles of aesthetic pleasure, operating across the senses, 
can be explained on the basis of such argumentation: (1) maximum effect for minimum 
means, (2) unity in variety, (3) most advanced, yet acceptable, and (4) optimal match.   
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Design aesthetics: principles of pleasure in design 
 
A typical Sunday afternoon, quiet all around, few people in the street in front of me, and 
nobody to disturb my flow of thoughts. I pick up my Sony Ericsson T630 mobile and feel 
how its shape fits comfortably in the palm of my hand. Together with the weight and tem-
perature of the device, it makes for a pleasurable interaction. I push the little joystick and a 
number of icons pop up on the screen. I want to look up the telephone number of a friend 
and understand that the image of a book must refer to the directory. Scrolling towards the 
icon and a second push confirm my prediction: I am on the right track. But, getting to my 
friend requires a lot more menus to go through and buttons to push and I finally get annoyed 
by the sheer complexity of the navigation structure. Just looking it up in my paper directory 
would have been much faster! Disappointed I put the phone aside. 
What I describe here is an account of a typical everyday experience with a product. It is 
an experience since it is demarcated by a beginning and an end to create a whole (Dewey, 
1934). During the experience, I performed actions, e.g. lifting, scrolling, pushing, and re-
ceived reactions from the device, e.g. weight, images, sounds. In Dewey’s words, there is a 
continuous alternation of doing and undergoing that together shape the experience. Since 
there is a product involved, we can easily call this experience a product experience. The 
question I would like to raise now is, can we also call this experience an aesthetic experi-
ence? Or is this the wrong question and should we rephrase it in, what part of the experience 
is aesthetic? 
In this paper I argue that indeed only part of the full experience (of products) should be 
considered aesthetic, i.e. pleasurable to the senses. The rest of the experience deals with 
faculties of the human mind, i.e. cognition and emotion, as we will see, and they should thus 
be conceptually separated. All three levels of the experience, the aesthetic, understanding, 
and emotional level, have their own, albeit highly related, underlying processes. These proc-
esses are not arbitrary, but lawful. Although this seems rather obvious for the way we under-
stand a product and respond to it emotionally, this also applies to our aesthetic responses to 
products. This is something we have only recently come to realize and the main part of this 
paper is devoted to an account of these lawful patterns underlying our aesthetic reactions. 
Before I discuss these aesthetic principles and their rationale, let us first look more closely at 
(the history of) the concept of aesthetics.  
 
 
Aesthetics 
 
‘Aesthetics’ comes from the Greek word aesthesis, referring to sensory perception and 
understanding or sensuous knowledge. In the eighteenth century, the philosopher Baumgar-
ten picked up the term and changed its meaning into gratification of the senses or sensuous 
delight (Goldman, 2001). Since works of art are (mostly) produced for this reason, i.e. to 
gratify our senses, the concept has since been applied to any aspect of the experience of art, 
such as aesthetic judgment, aesthetic attitude, aesthetic understanding, aesthetic emotion, and 
aesthetic value. These are all considered part of the aesthetic experience and although we can 
still experience nature or people aesthetically, the phrase is most often used in relation to the 
arts, especially visual art.  Design principles  159 
 
 
Figure 1: 
Schematic model of aesthetic experience  
(adapted from Leder, Belke, Oeberst and Augustin, 2004, BJP) 
 
 
The observation that the aesthetic experience is held to cover all processes involved in 
our interaction with a work of art, is perfectly illustrated in a recent model by Leder, Belke, 
Oeberst, and Augustin (2004, Figure 1). In this ‘model of aesthetic experience’, an observer 
of an artwork starts off with a perceptual analysis of the work, compares this to previous 
encounters, classifies the work into a meaningful category, and subsequently interprets and 
evaluates the work, resulting in an aesthetic judgment and an aesthetic emotion. Only the 
first two (or three) stages would be considered aesthetic in the Baumgarten sense of the 
word. In these, mostly automatic stages perception is at work and the degree to which our 
perceptual system manages to detect structure and assesses the work’s novelty/familiarity 
determines the affect that is generated. At these stages we talk about sensuous delight (or 
displeasure), whereas at later stages cognitive and emotional processes enter the experience. 
There is every reason to consider these stages part of the experience of the work of art, but 
there is also good reason not to call these stages aesthetic. 
Staying close to Baumgarten’s definition, I would propose to restrict the term aesthetic to 
the pleasure attained from sensory perception, as opposed to anesthetic. An experience of 
any kind, e.g., of an artwork, a product, a landscape, or an event, thus comprises an aesthetic 
part, but the experience as a whole is not aesthetic.  
 
 
Product experience 
 
Next to the aesthetic part, a typical experience involves understanding and an emotional 
episode. Although these three constituents of an experience are conceptually different, they 
are very much intertwined and impossible to distinguish at a phenomenological level. We 
experience the unity of sensuous delight, meaningful interpretation, and emotional involve-P. Hekkert  160 
ment, and only in this unity we can speak of an experience. So, why (re)installing this divi-
sion between the three building blocks of an experience? Next to the conceptual clarity it 
provides, in order to understand our experiences with the things around us, we need to look 
at underlying processes. And these processes are fundamentally different for the three con-
stituents. Before devoting the rest of this paper to the processes underlying our aesthetic 
pleasure (or aesthetic experience), let me briefly sketch the processes guiding our under-
standing of and emotional responses to the world.  
Given the above, a tentative definition of product experience would be: the entire set of 
effects that is elicited by the interaction between a user and a product, including the degree 
to which all our senses are gratified (aesthetic experience), the meanings we attach to the 
product (experience of meaning), and the feelings and emotions that are elicited (emotional 
experience). With respect to the attribution of meaning, many cognitive processes play a 
role, such as interpretation, retrieval from memory, and associations. These processes allow 
us to recognize metaphors, assign personality or other expressive characteristics, and assess 
the personal or symbolic significance of products (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi & Rochberg-
Halton, 1981). The attribution of meaning is, however, not an exclusive activity of the mind. 
In line with current developments in cognitive linguistics (e.g., Gibbs, 2003; Glenberg & 
Kaschak, 2002; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), we have recently demonstrated that our bodies 
and bodily actions also play an important role in understanding the figurative expressions of 
products (Van Rompay, Hekkert, Saakes, & Russo, 2005).  
The process underlying our emotional response to products can most accurately be de-
scribed by an appraisal model (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 1986; Scherer, Schorr, & Johns-
tone, 2001; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). According to these appraisal theorists, an emo-
tion is elicited by an evaluation (appraisal) of an event or situation as potentially beneficial 
or harmful to a person’s concerns. For example, on seeing a bracelet a person may experi-
ence desire because she expects that possessing it will fulfil her concern of being admired. 
An important implication of appraisal theory is that each distinct emotion has a distinctive 
pattern of appraisal, but there are few if any one-to-one relationships between a situation and 
an emotional response. It is interpretation of the event or situation, rather than the event 
itself, which causes the emotion. Since our emotional experience of products can also very 
well be explained by such an appraisal process (see Desmet & Hekkert, 2002), understanding 
this process holds a key to ‘designing for emotion’.  
 
 
Evolutionary aesthetics 
 
“The sensory aspects of the normal human being should be taken into consideration in all 
forms of design. Let’s take the Coca-Cola bottle, for instance. Even when wet and cold, its 
twin-sphered body offers a delightful valley for the friendly fold of one’s hand, a feel that is 
cozy and luscious” (Loewy, 1951, page 297). This is a perfect example of sensuous delight 
or how a product can gratify our senses, in this case our sense of touch. It belongs to the 
realm of aesthetic experience and I will now examine the underlying processes of aesthetic 
pleasure. In line with influential thinkers from philosophical aesthetics (e.g., Hume, 1757; 
Kant, 1952), I will show that some of the general principles of taste or aesthetic pleasure are 
uniform in human nature. This does not automatically imply universal agreement. Just like 
the process underlying our emotions is uniform, yet leading to individual differences as a Design principles  161 
result of interpretation differences, so can aesthetic responses differ in a lawful manner. It is 
only in this way that beauty can be said to lie in the ‘eyes of the beholder’. 
To trace the pattern underlying our aesthetic responses, we have to ask ourselves a sim-
ple, but very complicated question: why do we like things? As soon as we phrase the ques-
tion in terms of ‘why’ we ultimately force ourselves to look into the way human beings have 
evolved over time. When it comes to our thinking and behaviour, this is exactly what an 
increasing number of thinkers in psychology have been doing: trying to understand why we 
act the way we act [or think the way we think, or feel the way we feel] by explaining the 
advantages of these acts for the evolution of our species. Because aesthetic phenomena seem 
apparently useless, they offer a great challenge for evolutionary psychologists to explain. 
Many of them have thus devoted a lot of thinking to unfold the logic of aesthetic pleasure 
(see e.g. Hildebrand, 1999; Orians & Heerwagen, 1992; Pinker, 2002; Ramachandran & 
Hirstein, 1999) and our inclination to pursue artistic activities (Dissanayake, 1999; Tooby & 
Cosmides, 2001). Of all the hypotheses put forward by these thinkers, one has been most 
widely adopted over the years. It has been coined the ‘by-product’ hypothesis and it very 
well explains the origins of aesthetic pleasure through all our senses.  
Crucial to this hypothesis – in fact to all evolutionary thinking – is the notion of adapta-
tion. Since the main goal of humans is to survive in order to reproduce, we have faced many 
adaptive problems whose solution would be, sometimes very distally, beneficial to reproduc-
tion, such as finding a mate, avoid predators and obstacles, selecting nutritious food, or un-
derstanding the intentions of others. Through a slow process of natural selection, psycho-
logical mechanisms have evolved that are perfectly fit to solve these problems. These human 
design features are called adaptations (see e.g. Barkow, Cosmides & Tooby, 1992 and 
Pinker, 1997, for an extensive account of adaptationism).  
The logic of the by-product hypothesis is as elegant as simple. As demonstrated, adapta-
tions have evolved to serve functions beneficial to our survival. It would have been helpful 
for the development of these adaptations if things in the world around us that contribute to 
these functions were reinforced (Tooby & Cosmides, 2001). In other words, it must be bene-
ficial for humans to seek cues or patterns that serve these adaptive functions. We therefore 
(have come to) derive (aesthetic) pleasure from patterns or features that are advantageous to 
these functions. In a simplified form, this is the core of the by-product hypothesis. It is thus 
fair to conclude that “beauty exists in the adaptations of the beholder” (Symons, 1995).  
If we want to understand why certain stimuli are pleasing to the senses, we have to look 
into the functions of these adaptive systems. From these functions we can derive the aes-
thetic principle that explains why certain features of the world, in being functionally favour-
able, are aesthetically more pleasing than others. In many cases, the principles will be spe-
cific for certain adaptations – the visual system, the olfactory system – or even differ from 
domain to domain – landscape aesthetics, aesthetics of music. Since, as we will see, our 
modalities also have certain functional and organizational similarities, we believe there is a 
limited number of principles that are uniform across the senses. Contrary to what Tooby and 
Cosmides (2001) believe, there are unifying principles of aesthetic pleasure and they are 
informative. These principles will be discussed next, but let us first look into the primary 
functions of our sensory modalities.  P. Hekkert  162 
Adaptive functions of the senses 
 
Regular textbooks of perception treat all our sensory systems systematically and start 
each section or chapter with a general discussion of the system’s main function. A good 
example of such a textbook is Bruce Goldstein’s ‘Sensation and Perception’ (2002) and I 
will use this as the primary source for our overview of the functions of our senses. “One 
purpose of perception is to inform us about properties of the environment that are important 
for our survival” (p. 2), Goldstein argues in the beginning of his book. I believe this is the 
main purpose of all the senses and their functions can be directly or indirectly traced back to 
this ultimate purpose. 
By far the most prominent sensory system in perception research, and maybe the most 
dominant modality in our experience of the world, is the visual system. The main function of 
our visual system is to allow us to navigate through the world without bumping into objects 
or falling from cliffs all the time. Vision therefore allows us to detect obstacles, see passages, 
estimate distances; to see what actions the world affords. Next, vision also plays a prominent 
role in the identification of things, to signal us whether something is indeed one thing (partly 
hidden by something else), a possible resource or refuge, or potentially dangerous. Follow-
ing the previous argumentation, we can thus predict that we like to look at things that sup-
port navigation and identification. These ‘things’ are patterns in the environment that facili-
tate perceptual organization, so well described by the Gestalt psychologists. These patterns 
make us see relationships and differences, they make us see that certain things belong to-
gether whereas others are unrelated, and they help us to make a most likely and economi-
cally efficient interpretation of the world out there. In short, they bring order in the flow of 
information. We make visual artworks and derive pleasure from exposing ourselves to works 
of art because these do exactly this. The best – and most down-to-earth - definition of art 
ever proposed is “to preserve unity while almost allowing for chaos” (Boselie, 1996). 
Many events in the world cannot be seen, but it would certainly be helpful to be warned 
in time of the tiger that is approaching you. Luckily, you heard a rustle of leaves and this 
signalling is the most important function of our auditory system. More distally, communica-
tion also favours survival because it for example allows us to warn others and to cooperate. 
In sum, we like to hear events that help us to detect signals and afford communication. It has 
been proposed that many of the principles or Gestalt laws underlying visual organization 
represent our ‘best guesses’ to order the stream of auditory information (Bregman, 1990). It 
is easy to see that music is also based on such principles of repetition, closure, and similarity. 
A melody, for example, is a sequence of tones that look alike and follow each other in rapid 
pace, with only minor differences in pitch (Cross, 1995).  
Maybe the most crucial sense modality for survival is our ability to touch or be touched, 
foremost to feel pain and assess something as potentially dangerous, and to feel pleasure, 
motivating us to seek sexual activity. But our sense of touch, including proprioception, also 
provides us with information about the world, about the shape and weight of things, about its 
texture and temperature, its verticality and stability, and many other physical properties. 
Finally, and for some most importantly, our sense of touch makes us aware of having a body 
and thereby forms a basis for the experience of self (Bermudez, Marcel, & Eilan, 1995). 
Next to direct reinforcing effects of touch in pain and pleasure, we like to feel things that 
afford knowing and (self) learning. Again, principles of perceptual organization provide a 
key to these tactual functions. Few works of art address these possible sources of tactual Design principles  163 
pleasure, but designers have always explored this potential in for example the designs of 
baby toys, control panels, and cuddle walls.  
The relationship between functioning and pleasantness is maybe most univocal for our 
chemical senses, the senses that allow us to smell and taste: “… things that are bad for us 
often taste or smell unpleasant, and things that are good for us generally taste or smell good.” 
(Goldstein, 2002, p. 474). For this reason, these senses are considered the ‘gatekeepers’ of 
the body, identifying what is nutritious and should be consumed and detecting what is bad 
and must be rejected. Next, odours inform us about a person’s health, fitness, and fertility 
and as such play an important role in sexual attractivity (e.g., Doty, 1981; Thornhill & 
Gangerstad, 1999). Simply put, we like to smell/taste things that afford survival and repro-
duction. Needless to say that the meals we prepare everyday comply with this function, as 
well as the scents that are often designed to stimulate sexual arousal. Finally, smell is a rich 
source for associations and thus serves our ability to memorize past places and events. 
“The mind organ … and thoughts are treated as a sense and its object because that is how 
they appear in experience: we feel that we perceive our thoughts with our mind just as we 
perceive a visible object with our eye” (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991, p. 64). For our 
line of reasoning, adding this ‘sixth sense’ (smell and taste are normally treated separately) 
to our list is easily defendable. Our mind has also evolved to execute a range of functions, 
e.g. to understand and classify the things and events in the world around us, to solve prob-
lems, to plan and control our actions (see e.g., Barsalou, 1999), and to anticipate their conse-
quences. The thoughts, categories, ideas, models, and solutions we design to perform these 
functions obey to the same laws of organization and economy as the input for the other 
senses. To see what these laws are, we now turn to the first, overarching principle of aes-
thetic pleasure. 
 
 
Principle 1: maximum effect for minimum means 
 
Possibly generalizable over all the senses is the assumption that our systems want to 
function as economically as possible. If we can smell, see, hear, or decide something faster 
or with less effort, we will prefer it over the more demanding alternative. This is summarized 
in the principle of maximum effect for minimum means. We like to invest a minimal amount 
of means, such as effort, resources, brain capacity, to attain the highest possible effect, in 
terms of survival, reproduction, learning or explaining. So, a theory or formula is considered 
beautiful when it only has a few assumptions or parameters that can describe or predict a 
vast range of phenomena (Boselie & Leeuwenberg, 1985). Likewise, a visual pattern is 
pleasing to the eye when relatively simple design features reveal a wealth of information, 
such as in caricatures or impressionistic paintings.  
In a different area, Margulies (1977) demonstrated that the same principle can be applied 
to chess problems. A move leading to a checkmate without the capturing of a piece was 
considered as aesthetically more pleasing than one in which a piece had to be taken. Apply-
ing this principle to the area of design, we can for example look at the Domus winery of the 
Swiss architects Herzog & de Meuron (Figure 2). In order to design a building that would 
perfectly fit into the California landscape of rocky hills, they build a cage-like construction 
and filled it with rocks from the surroundings. This simple solution results in a range of  
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Figure 2: 
Domus winery by Herzog and de Meuron. 
 
 
effects; the fit is easily established, the construction is cheap and very solid, the thick walls 
bring about a cool and constant inside temperature, and above all, the sunbeams that peep 
through the walls cause a poetic pattern of dancing lights. The net result is one of high aes-
thetic quality. 
Two special cases of this principle are now discussed in detail, conjunctive ambiguity 
and metaphor. When a pattern is ambiguous, it allows for more than one interpretation. 
Think for example of the famous duck-rabbit drawing that can be seen as a duck or a rabbit. 
These two interpretations of the drawing are incompatible; you either see the duck or the 
rabbit. This is a typical case of disjunctive ambiguity, a type of ambiguity that is regarded as 
detrimental to beauty. In some case however, the two (or more) interpretations are only 
perceptually incompatible. In those cases, the additional interpretation or meaning adds 
something to the pattern that is physically compatible with the first interpretation. A good 
example, again from the field of architecture, is the famous Institut du Monde Arabe in Paris 
from the French architect Jean Nouvel (Figure 3), also described elsewhere (Cupchik, 2003). 
Approaching this building from a distance, one sees a façade that refers to the typical weave 
patterns from Islamic culture, as can for example be observed in Persian tapestry. When 
getting close to the building, one discovers that many of the holes that make out the weave 
pattern are actually shutters that could be opened or closed, depending on the amount of  
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Figure 3 : 
Institut du Monde Arabe by Jean Nouvel. 
 
 
sunlight that is allowed to enter the building. This (functional) interpretation at a local level 
is compatible with the one at the global level and thereby adds to the overall aesthetic im-
pression of the design. Conjunctive ambiguity is therefore said to enhance the beauty of a 
pattern (e.g. Arnheim, 1974) and Boselie and Leeuwenberg (1985) provided empirical evi-
dence for this principle in their classic study of polygons. 
Metaphor has for long been seen as a stylistic device to say something that is difficult to 
express in words. For this reason, we often use metaphors to express our emotional feelings, 
as in “frozen with fear”. Recently, it has been acknowledged that the application of meta-
phors is much more widespread and that we use metaphors as an economical and efficient 
way of expression that is not restricted to language (e.g., Forceville, Hekkert, & Tan, 2006; 
Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999). Via a simple reference to something else (the source), we 
can map a wealth of meaning and a novel perspective onto the target. A subtle example is the 
very popular coffeemaker by Philips, the Senseo Crema (Figure 4), that consists of a curved 
shaped reservoir ‘holding’ a little plateau on which the cups must be placed. In an embodied 
way, the bended shape refers to a servant, courteously serving you the coffee (see Forceville 
et al., 2005, for an extensive discussion of this example). As a result, this minimal design 
feature has a big effect on our experience of the coffee maker.  
Up to now, all examples demonstrating the principle of maximum effect for minimum 
means have been drawn from the fields of vision and mind. It is probably not too difficult to 
come up with examples for other sensory domains. Instead of extending the list of examples, 
I will now turn to three other and highly related principles of aesthetic pleasure. These prin-
ciples are closely allied to this first overarching principle. In their discussion I will occasion-
ally present examples for other sensory domains. In general however, I think the claim is 
defendable that all four principles are modality independent and can explain what is pleasing 
in the areas of vision, sound, touch, smell/taste, and mind.  P. Hekkert  166 
 
 
Figure 4: 
Senseo Crema coffee maker (Philips). 
 
 
Principle 2: unity in variety 
 
Going back to the functions of the senses, we see that most of them are active in gather-
ing information about the world and identifying what is bad or harmful or what is good or 
contributes to our survival. The world out there is however loaded with information and we 
can simply not pick up any source that happens to be within reach. It is therefore beneficial 
to perceive connections and make relationships; to see what belongs together and what not. 
In sum, in order to perform these tasks, our sensory systems must detect order in chaos or 
unity in variety.  
Unity in variety is an age-old principle that was already acknowledged by the Greeks, 
but only recently we have come to understand the evolutionary and neurophysiological ra-
tionale behind it (Ramachandran, 2004; Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999). In order to explain 
this logic, let us look at one of the underlying mechanisms that allows us to bring order or 
perceive unity. We tend to see things that are close together or look, sound, or feel the same 
as belonging together. This perceptual tendency of grouping, of discovering relations, is 
reinforcing because it allows us to detect objects or meaningful wholes, such as the tiger that 
is partly hidden behind the tree. Next to this evolutionary advantage, there is a clear neuro-
physiological advantage for making connections. Given the limitations of our brain’s capac-
ity, extracting relationships is an economically sound way to minimize allocation of atten-
tional resources.  
Like grouping, some of these unifying mechanisms are known as the Gestalt laws of per-
ceptual organization, such as symmetry, good continuation, and closure. As discussed be-
fore, these laws also govern the organisation of auditory information. Detecting such struc-
tural relations is thus rewarding, leading some to argue that the aesthetic experience of music 
is (nothing more than) the perception of organization and regularities, such as rhythm, mo-
tifs, and harmony, in tonal sequences (Scruton, 1983). Complex pieces of music often re-Design principles  167 
quire repeated hearing to derive all details of the musical structures and bring them into full 
integration (Jackendorff, 1987). 
Other mechanisms that have been proposed, like peak shift, isolation, contrast, and solv-
ing puzzles (see Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999), can be explained on the basis of the same 
logic. Contrast, for example, helps us to detect dissimilarities between features or objects 
that are close, but do not belong together. This principle is often applied in meals to make us 
appreciate the variety between the courses, while at the same time the tastes within each 
course have to correspond, hence unity in variety. Solving puzzles, finally, is an interesting 
special case. Because we like to see connections, we also consider it aesthetically pleasing to 
invest effort in finding them. This not only explains why we like crosswords and other puz-
zles, it may also explain why we are attracted to people and designs that do not give every-
thing away at once, such as complex buildings and products that make use of translucent 
materials to partly conceal the internal components from human eyes, like the famous Apple 
I-mac.  
 
 
Principle 3: most advanced, yet acceptable 
 
One of the most tested theories in aesthetics is the preference-for-prototypes theory 
(Whitfield & Slatter, 1979; see Whitfield, 2000, for an overview). According to this theory 
we prefer the most typical examples of a category, the ones that are often also very familiar 
and we have been exposed to repeatedly. Such a preference for familiar things is adaptive 
since it will lead to safe choices instead of risking the unknown. As Bornstein (1989, p. 282) 
rhetorically puts it: “Who was likely to survive longer, reproduce, and pass on genetic mate-
rial (and inherited traits) to subsequent generations, the cave dweller who had a healthy fear 
of the strange and unfamiliar beasts lurking outside, or the more risk-taking (albeit short-
lived) fellow who, on spying an unfamiliar animal in the distance, decided that he wanted a 
closer look?”  
At the same time, people have always been attracted by new, unfamiliar, and original 
things, partly to overcome boredom and saturation effects (Martindale, 1990). It has been 
argued that such a preference for novel instances is also an adaptive trait, especially for 
children, in that novelty facilitates learning. Since these two traits seem incompatible, we 
have recently performed a series of studies to look into the joint effects of typicality and 
novelty on aesthetic preference (Hekkert, Snelders, & van Wieringen, 2003). These studies 
provided empirical evidence for the principle coined MAYA, Most Advanced, Yet Accept-
able, by the famous American designer Raymond Loewy (1951). As these studies, of e.g. 
telephones, teakettles, and cars, show, typicality and novelty ratings are highly negatively 
correlated, but this correlation is not perfect. As a result, it is to some extent possible to 
increase the novelty of a design while preserving its typicality. We tend to prefer products 
with an optimal combination of both aspects. 
So far, the MAYA principle has only been tested in the visual domain. Given that people, 
for instance, also like music that is familiar (Gaver & Mandler, 1989) as well as typical 
musical performances (Repp, 1997), while a constant striving for novelty can also be wit-
nessed in music, the MAYA principle most likely also applies to the auditory domain. A 
good example of the operation of MAYA in music is the popularity of remixes of old songs, 
such as the contemporary beat attached to Presley’s “A little less conversation” (Junkie XL, P. Hekkert  168 
2002). Similar positive relationships between familiarity and pleasantness have been, consis-
tently and cross-culturally, demonstrated for odours (e.g. Distel, Ayabe-Kanamura, 
Martínez-Gómez, Schicker, Kobayakawa, Saito, & Hudson, 1999) and cognitive categories 
such as nonsense and meaningful words (Bornstein, 1989) and brands (Nedungadi & Hut-
chinson, 1985). Following the same line of reasoning as for the auditory domain, it seems 
safe to predict that the MAYA principle holds for all sensory domains. 
 
 
Principle 4: optimal match 
 
Products are always multi-modal, they address various senses simultaneously. When 
driving a car, we see the dashboard, hear the engine and the clicking sound of the indicators, 
feel the steering wheel and road-holding, and smell the leather of the upholstery. The final 
principle is concerned with the relationship between these various sensory impressions. 
Since, as I have argued, ease of identification has survival value, we tend to prefer products 
that convey similar messages to all our senses. Consistency of impressions will lead to ele-
vated identification accuracy (Zellner, Bartoli, & Eckard, 1991). Schifferstein and Verlegh 
(1996), for instance, showed that the levels of the smell and taste components in foods must 
match for an optimal pleasantness. Next to intensity levels, the product aspects that stimulate 
the various senses could be congruent on the theme or association conveyed and the level of 
(individual) affect they produce. Note that we see here how the aesthetic experience links to 
the experience of meaning. Whereas attaching a particular theme or association to a sensory 
aspect is a non-aesthetic attribution process, assessing whether these labels are congruent is 
regarded an aesthetic event; it is pleasing to the mind to see that the themes match, it is dis-
pleasing when it finds out the labels are incongruent.  
Most likely, congruency not only holds for the internal consistency of the various sen-
sory impressions, each also has to be appropriate for the particular product. This type of 
appropriateness can be found in the famous dictum ‘form follows function’ that could now 
easily be transformed to the other senses in ‘sound/touch/smell follows function’. It is impor-
tant to stress in this respect that this function is not restricted to a utilitarian one. The func-
tion of a product can very well be experiential, like to enjoy, to enrich, to inspire, to 
strengthen one’s identity, etcetera, and many believe such experiences are nowadays more 
decisive in people’s buying behaviour than the primary or utilitarian function as such. Mak-
ing all the sensory messages congruent with the intended, overall experience is therefore an 
important task for designers. Nevertheless, in some cases the designer may wish to accom-
plish an experience of surprise, for example to increase interest or prolong the attention 
value of a product. In those cases, establishing incongruity between sensory messages, for 
example between the visual and tactual domain, could be an effective strategy (Ludden, 
Schifferstein, & Hekkert, 2006).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article I have made a start with exploring cross-modality principles of aesthetic 
pleasure. The rationale behind these principles is an evolutionary one. If certain patterns in 
the environment contribute to the functioning of our senses, it is reinforcing to expose our-Design principles  169 
selves to these patterns. Hence, we have come to derive aesthetic pleasure from seeing, hear-
ing, touching, smelling/tasting, and thinking certain patterns that are beneficial to our pri-
mary sense’s functioning. Four principles have been proposed that each can be traced back to 
this underlying logic. The fact that this logic is based on evolutionary theory does not auto-
matically imply that all principles lead to universal aesthetic agreement. Depending on the 
nature of the principle, people can to varying degrees agree on the aesthetic appeal of a pat-
tern.  
The first principle of maximum effect for minimal means could be considered as the 
overarching principle. In general, a theory, chess move, building, or any other solution or 
design is considered beautiful or pleasing when a great effect is attained with only a mini-
mum of means. As long as people agree on the magnitude of the effect and similarly estimate 
the amount of means applied, they will agree on the aesthetic attractivity of the result. Dar-
win’s (1859) theory of natural selection is univocally appreciated for the wealth and diver-
sity of natural phenomena it can explain on the basis of just a few simple assumptions.  
The second principle of unity in variety, and its related ordering principles of grouping, 
contrast, closure, and isolation, most likely ends up in aesthetic universals. The only re-
quirement here is sensitivity. Our senses have to be sensitive enough to perceive the, some-
times hidden, structure. For that reason, some pieces of modern music can only be appreci-
ated by a trained ear that is receptive to the principles of unity that are below the surface. 
When we look at the MAYA principle, it is easy to see that people will only prefer the same 
product or musical piece when they agree on the degree of originality and typicality. Since 
these ratings very much depend on personal experiences with and exposure to these and like 
products, the MAYA principle will often lead to individual differences. In the case of the 
fourth principle, optimal match, agreement will arise when we agree on the quality all com-
ponents have to be congruent with. For example, the components of a product can be con-
gruent with respect to their intensity, but incongruent when it comes to their semantic mean-
ing. The type of product, its function, and the context in which it is used will probably  
(co-)determine this quality.   
In sum, these principles can predict and explain people’s aesthetic responses. When these 
principles are ‘correctly’ applied, it is most likely, but not necessary, that people will agree 
on an object’s aesthetic value. Sometimes, differences will arise at the group level, when a 
group shares the same underlying characteristics – we often refer to such a group as a cul-
ture, sometimes even at the individual level. These differences can, however, still be viewed 
as “the product of a common underlying evolved psychology, operating under different 
circumstances” (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, p. 45). Put differently, the principles reflect 
universal psychological mechanisms and cultural or individual manifestations are variations 
of these 'themes' brought forward by the degree to which people share the underlying charac-
teristics. These characteristics, in terms of sensitivity (principle 2), perceived typicality and 
originality (principle 3), or the quality focused on (principle 4), will be, more or less, shared 
if people have similar backgrounds or previous experiences. It is in this sense that aesthetic 
responses, like cognitive processes, are situated, i.e., arising from the interaction between 
people and their environments (Smith & Semin, 2004), and subsequently obtain their social 
or cultural mode of expression. As Tooby and Cosmides (1992) convincingly argue, “The 
social and the cultural are not alternatives to the biological. They are aspects of evolved 
human biology and, hence, they are the kind of things to which evolutionary analysis can be 
properly applied.” (p. 86) P. Hekkert  170 
Of course, it is easy to come up with real life examples of objects deemed aesthetic that 
do not obey to one of the principles described here and many cultural manifestations may 
even seem to reflect the exact opposite of what a certain principle would require. Extreme 
ornamentations we can encounter all over the world in churches, buildings, jewellery, etcet-
era, may for example be regarded as opposing a maximum effect for minimal means princi-
ple. As omnipresent as such manifestations are, they do not undermine the validity and uni-
versality of the mechanisms proposed. When they are violated or obscured, the designer did 
so because certain properties were (temporarily) highly valued in a particular group or cul-
ture, but for other than aesthetic reasons. These properties, such as ornaments, may represent 
status, wealth, or religious gratitude and thus contribute to a desired experience of meaning. 
In other cases, violations may have been implemented to evoke a particular emotion, as I 
showed in the case of ‘surprise’. To conclude, however, unless one has very good (often 
non-aesthetic) reasons to do so, the best recommendation I can give is to obey these univer-
sal principles.  
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